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Abstract 
Financial literacy may not be as effective as previously thought in protecting against fraud 
victimisation. It does not inoculate investors from persuasion or social engineering tactics 
used by offenders to secure investment in fraudulent schemes. In fact, recent research 
indicates that over-confidence in investment knowledge may make individuals more 
susceptible to fraud. Using boiler room fraud as a case study, this paper presents the PREY 
(Profiled, Relational, Exploitable, and Yielding) model to capture the psychological tactics 
used by fraud perpetrators to influence the thoughts and decision-making processes of 
individuals. The PREY model operationalizes the tenets of social engineering and 
demonstrates how such tactics could be re-engineered to increase the effectiveness of fraud 
prevention within the financial literacy context. 
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Fraud and its PREY: Conceptualising social engineering tactics and its 
impact on financial literacy outcomes 
 
Introduction 
An unexpected finding within the financial literacy debate centres on the relationship 
between financial literacy levels and fraud victimisation. It has often been assumed that 
increasing financial literacy levels would also act as a protective factor for individuals falling 
victim to financial and investment fraud. Whilst some support for this assumption has been 
found (eg. Gamble et al., 2012; Lusardi, 2012) a number of researchers have in fact reported 
that financial literacy is associated with higher levels of victimisation (AARP, 2007, 2008, 
2011; ACC and AIC, 2012; NASD, 2006). The NASD Investor Education Foundation (now 
FINRA Investor Education Foundation), concluded that ‘financial literacy programs are 
necessary but probably not sufficient to prevent fraud’ (NASD, 2006, p.6). This represents a 
major challenge for the financial literacy agenda. 
This paper makes a positive contribution to the financial literacy field through its 
examination of an approach that not only strives to more effectively address the challenge of 
financial fraud but can also be used as a proactive, fraud prevention framework. Using 
investment fraud (also known as boiler room fraud; the selling of (usually) fraudulent 
investment products at inflated prices) as a case study, the paper illustrates how victimisation 
can be better understood through the application of social engineering theory and persuasion 
tactics used by offenders in perpetrating fraudulent investment schemes. The PREY (Profiled, 
Relational, Exploitable, and Yielding) model, developed in this paper based on a review of 
the literature, captures and summarises those psychological tactics used by fraud perpetrators 
to influence the thoughts and decision-making processes of individuals. Relevant to financial 
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fraud, the model seeks to move financial literacy education towards an expanded curriculum, 
going beyond knowledge and application of financial matters and generic warnings about 
financial fraud. It is concluded that the curriculum needs to explicitly include education on 
social engineering and persuasion techniques. Whilst it is argued that this approach is 
relevant across all offerings of financial literacy education, the demonstrated link between 
age, financial literacy knowledge and fraud victimisation makes education focused on social 
engineering and persuasion techniques highly relevant to target groups with these 
characteristics. 
Definition and prevalence of investment fraud 
To begin, it is important to define investment fraud and to consider its prevalence. Prevalence 
rates of investment fraud provide some basis on which to assess the need and urgency for 
fraud education to be prioritised within the financial literacy curriculum. 
Investment fraud through the use of cold calling (or boiler room fraud) can be seen to operate 
through four distinct phases. While these may be unique to individual situations, there is a 
general pattern which can be characterised by the stages below: 
1) Initial approach by the offender to the potential investor, outlining the opportunity and 
seeking approval to send documentation about the potential investment. 
2) Follow up by the offender to confirm the receipt of the marketing materials and solicit 
a financial commitment to the investment opportunity. 
3) Continued contact by the offender to reassure the victim of their investment, and to 
offer additional investment opportunities. 
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4) A crisis point, where the victim (for whatever reason) wants to exit their investment 
but is informed that they cannot do this. The victim may then be convinced to reinvest in 
another opportunity or alternatively may begin to suspect that they have been defrauded. 
Turning to the issue of prevalence, investment fraud represents a significant threat to the 
financial security. In 2011, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) established Taskforce 
Galilee to examine the issue of serious and organised investment fraud in Australia. This 
taskforce estimated that between January 2007 and April 2012, more than A$113 million was 
lost by over 2600 victims (ACC and AIC, 2012). Serious and organised investment fraud was 
defined as:  
‘a) Any unsolicited contact, by telephone or internet, of persons in Australia 
(potential investors) by persons (callers) usually located overseas, where such callers 
engage in conduct that is fraudulent, false, misleading or deceptive with the purpose 
of inducing potential investors to buy, sell or retain securities or other investments and 
where such callers do not have the licence or authority to engage in a securities 
business, or investment advice business in Australia; and 
b) May include superannuation and investment fraud’ (ACC and AIC, 2012, p.5) 
Earlier research by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), reported 
that between 1999 and 2002 more than 7,300 people across Australia had contacted them in 
relation to a cold calling experience (ASIC, 2002a). Approximately 80% of these people had 
lost money (ASIC, 2002a). At this time, ASIC conservatively estimated that victims may 
have been defrauded in excess of $A400 million (ASIC, 2002a). These Australian findings 
are echoed across the United Kingdom and the United States. In the United Kingdom, it is 
estimated that 3.5 billion pounds each year is lost by victims of mass marketing fraud (which 
includes investment fraud) (National Fraud Authority (NFA), 2012) and in the United States, 
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the comparable annual fraud cost has been calculated to be in excess of $50 billion (Deevy et 
al., 2012).  
Given the prevalence of fraud and the generally accepted assumption that these statistics are 
likely to grossly underestimate its true impact, this type of fraud has serious implications for 
the financial well-being of those victimised. In this paper, financial well-being is defined as 
“a state of being financially healthy, happy, and free from worry’’ (Joo 2008, cited in 
Malone, Stewart, Wilson and Korsching, 2010, p. 63). Financial literacy certainly has a role 
to play in working towards minimising and preventing investors being defrauded. However, 
as the following discussion will explore the answer does not necessarily lie with simply 
increasing financial literacy levels. The relationship between financial literacy and fraud 
prevention is more complex. 
Relationship between financial literacy and fraud outcomes 
As discussed earlier, financial literacy may not be as effective as previously thought in 
protecting against fraud victimisation. The ACC and Australian Institute of Criminology’s 
(AIC) (2012) report on the outcomes of Taskforce Galilee found that victims of investment 
fraud were more financially literate, had previously invested in other companies and appeared 
on share-holder registers. Research conducted with older persons has been particularly 
consistent in this finding. Research conducted by NASD (2006) found that older victims of 
financial fraud compared to non-victims actually scored higher on tests of financial literacy 
knowledge. This was similar to conclusions drawn in earlier research published by American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) (AARP, 2007, 2008, 2011). 
The financial literacy and fraud victimisation relationship creates a significant challenge to 
those involved in financial literacy as an often stated goal of financial literacy involves fraud 
education (Taskforce on Financial Literacy, 2010). A rudimentary analysis of the research 
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could lead to the conclusion that financial literacy education, particularly in respect to fraud 
victimisation, is simply counterproductive. As a specific example, the argument is logical 
when reflecting on data that suggests that higher rates of financial literacy is generally 
correlated with age (ANZ, 2011) and in turn, age is often correlated with higher levels of 
financial fraud victimisation (AARP, 2011; NASD, 2006). However, the implication of this 
research is not of course to discontinue efforts to improve financial literacy levels. What is 
needed is a re-examination and deeper consideration of the relationship between financial 
literacy, fraud, current approaches used in the financial literacy curriculum and identifying 
and focusing education efforts on those most at risk of victimisation. The essential issue is 
how the financial literacy curriculum can be improved to address and ultimately prevent this 
spurious outcome.  
A large research study conducted by NASD (2006) provides some useful insights into why 
financial literacy may be correlated with higher levels of victimisation. In turn, the research 
allows important conclusions to be drawn in respect to how the financial literacy curriculum 
could be redesigned in order to more effectively tackle financial fraud.  
The NASD (2006) report, in seeking to account for their findings correlating financial 
literacy with increased victimisation rates, proposes three possible explanations. The 
researchers propose that one reason that those who are more financial literate are vulnerable 
to fraud is that even though they theoretically know how to avoid fraud, they fail to apply 
fraud protection and avoidance measures to their own situation. This is called the ‘knowing-
doing gap’ (NASD, 2006). A further explanation is the ‘expert snare’ whereby individuals 
who are more financially literate have an over-confidence in their investment abilities and 
decisions (NASD, 2006). Other researchers have also discussed the over-confidence trap 
(Gamble et al., 2012). It has been calculated that ‘one standard deviation increase in 
overconfidence in financial knowledge increases the odds of falling victim to fraud by 38%’ 
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(Gamble et al., 2012, p.3). Whilst these two explanations are useful, they provide less 
direction as to how the financial literacy curriculum could be redesigned to more effectively 
minimise fraud victimisation. It is argued in this paper that the third explanation provided by 
NASD (2006), ‘low persuasion literacy’ is the key to redesigning the financial literacy 
curriculum. It has the potential to address the ‘expert snare’ and make inroads into the 
‘knowing-doing gap’. 
NASD (2006) state that ‘low persuasion literacy’ exposes investors to fraud, despite their 
comparatively higher levels of financial literacy, because financial literacy does not inoculate 
investors from the psychological persuasion tactics used by fraud perpetrators. The 
effectiveness of financial literacy as it is related to financial fraud may be much more about 
awareness of fraud tactics than about financial knowledge. Whilst both are important, it is 
persuasion tactics that have perhaps been the least directly acknowledged and addressed in 
the financial literacy curriculum. 
Based on this premise, the following discussion begins by illustrating how victimisation can 
be understood through applying social engineering theory and the use of persuasion tactics by 
offenders in perpetrating fraudulent investment schemes. This analysis leads to the 
formulation of the PREY (Profiled, Relational, Exploitable, and Yielding) model. The PREY 
model is examined in light of its proposed contribution to financial literacy education through 
its direct articulation of social persuasion and social engineering tactics, moving financial 
literacy curriculum beyond generic warnings about financial fraud. This paper is focused on 
improving the content-base and curricula of financial literacy education. The following 
discussion presents the key crime prevention messages that derive from this approach. In 
turn, the discussion highlights the target groups and types of educational contexts which 
would most benefit from this addition to financial literacy educational content. 
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Introduction to persuasion tactics and social engineering 
The key tenets of social engineering have been built from an understanding of the psychology 
of persuasion tactics primarily from the social psychology literature (Rusch, 1999). Whilst 
there are a number of definitions of social engineering perhaps the most fundamental is that 
provided by Manske (2000). Manske (2000, p.53) defines social engineering as ‘the practice 
of acquiring information through technical and non-technical means’. Some definitions focus 
on the ways in which social engineers seek to gain unauthorised access to corporate computer 
systems and networks (Abraham and Chengular-Smith, 2010), or deceive people into sharing 
sensitive information (Power and Forte, 2006). Consistent across most definitions is reference 
to the primary goal of social engineering, being the capture of information or ‘the use of 
trickery, persuasion, impersonation, emotional manipulation and abuse of trust to gain 
information or computer access through the human interface’ (Thompson, 2006, p.222). 
The process of social engineering as discussed in this paper draws on the key elements of 
social engineering as defined by Thompson (2006) to explain how offenders perpetrate 
investment fraud. However, in this paper, the social engineering process defines the end goal 
of social engineering not just as personal information or the ability to gain computer/account 
access (though these may be an important part of the whole victimisation experience); rather 
the end goal involves directly obtaining money or financial rewards from the victim. In other 
words social engineering is a general act of deception. Similarly, Beaver (2009, p.35) 
concludes ‘social engineering is nothing more than exploiting human being for malicious 
purposes’, and as such, can easily be understood in terms of illegitimate financial gain. 
The PREY model 
Given the foundational premise of this paper, that is, financial literacy education needs to be 
expanded to include a focus on techniques of social engineering and persuasion, the PREY 
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model is presented. The PREY model is an acronym for: Profiled, Relational, Exploitable and 
Yielding. It has been formulated to articulate the skills and techniques used by offenders in 
perpetrating investment (boiler room) fraud and can be used to assist investors to better 
identify and protect themselves against such approaches. The PREY model challenges 
investors to cast themselves in a predator versus prey scenario. The actors are investors who 
are viewed as potential ‘prey’ and fraud offenders who are the ‘predators’. The concept of 
PREY is able to illustrate the nature of interaction between the offender and potential 
investor, where the ultimate goal of an offender perpetrating boiler room fraud is to obtain 
money from victims, and they will do whatever is necessary to achieve the highest amount of 
financial gain possible. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The PREY model is graphically represented in Figure 1 to capture the stages in the cycle of 
victimisation. The outer arrows feeding into the PREY model articulate the social 
engineering phases, as defined by Mitnick and Simon (2002), which are relevant to each 
stage of the PREY model. 
Profiled  
Investors need to be aware that offenders will typically profile them prior to any contact. This 
correlates with the first phase of social engineering, the research phase (Bakhshi et al., 2009; 
Mitnick and Simon, 2002). In the profiled stage, the offender attempts to identify the 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a potential target before initiating the first phone call. 
Specifically, in the case of boiler room fraud, offenders garner details of potential investors or 
victims from a number of legitimate and illegitimate sources. While there may be a number 
of methods by which the offender obtains information about the potential victim, the crucial 
step relates to what the offender does with that information. The offender is likely to already 
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know key characteristics about the potential investor, including demographics, occupation 
and previous investment history (Workman, 2007a). This information is then used to 
specifically pitch the fraudulent investment opportunity to the victim in a way that is most 
favourable to the potential investor. Achievement of the profiled stage, operationalised in the 
research phase of social engineering, is essential to the overall success in gaining investment 
from the victim (Workman, 2007a). 
Understanding this stage of victimisation and the tactics employed has direct relevance to 
formulating fraud prevention measures. Individuals need to recognise that when they receive 
a cold call regarding investment opportunities, that those contacting them have already 
researched them to determine points of vulnerability. The offender has researched the 
potential investor to determine the most effective way of developing trust and rapport and 
then uses this to maximise the likelihood that they will solicit a positive response to the 
investment offer. At this stage, the best fraud prevention measure that potential victims can 
enact is to discontinue the call immediately before the offender can manipulate the potential 
victim into becoming involved or interested in the offer. 
Relational  
The relational stage correlates with the second phase of social engineering, the development 
of trust and rapport (Bakhshi et al., 2009; Mitnick and Simon, 2002), and is enacted in the 
first stage of boiler room fraud, being the initial cold call. At this stage, potential victims need 
to be aware that offenders will do whatever is necessary to develop a relationship with them. 
Offenders will employ a variety of psychological tactics and persuasion techniques to 
establish trust from the victim. Trust is one of the most prominent factors behind successful 
social engineering attacks (Applegate, 2009; Okenyi and Owens, 2007; Peltier, 2006). 
Thompson (2006, p. 222) argues that ‘social engineering succeeds because most people work 
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under the assumption that others are essentially honest. As a pure matter of probability, this is 
true: the vast majority of communications we receive during the day are completely innocent 
in character’.  
In applying this to boiler room fraud, the offender seeks to build rapport and gain the trust of 
the potential investor. Having already researched the potential investor, the offender will have 
determined how to expedite the establishment of trust and rapport required (Workman, 
2007a). It is unlikely that the offender will try to persuade the potential investor into making 
a financial decision at this initial stage. Instead, the offender will seek approval to send 
information to the victim about the potential investment opportunity. This approach is 
effective because the sending of information may seem harmless given that there is no 
implied monetary commitment at this stage. However, this is a deliberate and effective ploy 
that facilitates further contact. 
This stage also seeks to build trust and credibility in respect to the investment opportunity 
itself. This is likely to include (but is not limited to) the production of marketing materials 
and prospectuses, the creation of false websites and the provision of referees who will attest 
to the reputation of the offender and the fraudulent company (ACC and AIC, 2012; ASIC, 
2002a, 2002b). Each of these will contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the investment 
opportunity offered and encourage the potential investor to financially commit. Many 
potential investors will conduct their own research and due diligence without realising they 
are relying on false information created by the offender. 
Relevant to fraud prevention, it is essential to educate potential victims of the levers that 
offenders are using during this stage. At this stage, offenders are seeking to capitalise on the 
trust that the potential investor has in the legitimacy of the caller and the investment 
opportunity they are promoting. Potential victims should be aware that once the relationship 
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is established between the offender and themselves it becomes more difficult to be objective 
about the process. Further, as the relationship develops the offender uses each interaction to 
actively seek out information that allows them to further build the profile of the potential 
victim. This has relevance to the final social engineering phase, utilisation of information 
(Bakhshi et al., 2009; Mitnick and Simon, 2002) whereby information garnered from the 
victim is actively used in the victimisation process. Personal information collated by the 
offender maximises the likelihood that the offender is able to counter any suspicions that the 
victim may have about the investments and ensure that the specific persuasion techniques 
they employ will be optimally effective. 
Exploitable 
Potential victims require an understanding that offenders view them as commodities that are 
open to exploitation. The exploitable stage is correlated with the third stage of social 
engineering, the exploitation of trust (Bakhshi et al., 2009; Mitnick and Simon, 2002) and the 
second and third stages of boiler room fraud involving the initial follow-up call as well as 
continued phone calls. Offenders employ a number of persuasion techniques and 
psychological tactics to take advantage of the trust established between victim and offender. 
Many social engineers employ tactics of fear, authority and reprisal to gain compliance 
(Abraham and Chengular-Smith, 2010; Applegate, 2009; Workman, 2007b, 2008). Fear can 
operate through the threat of suspension or security breach of an account, or through the 
promise of a limited offer (known as scarcity) (Workman, 2008). The use of authority is 
usually coupled with fear tactics, and exploits the inherent nature of persons to submit to 
authority figures. Social engineers can also appeal to the curiosity, empathy or excitement of 
an individual about a presented opportunity (Abraham and Chengular-Smith, 2010).  
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In the case of boiler room fraud, offenders will use a combination of these tactics and 
techniques to obtain a financial commitment from the victim. Research conducted on 
transcripts of offenders and their fraud pitches found that across 128 transcripts, 1,103 
influence tactics were identified, with an average of 8.6 tactics used per script (NASD, 2006). 
Thirteen common tactics used by offenders pitching investment opportunities were identified 
(NASD, 2006). This analysis reveals that offenders will attempt to overwhelm their potential 
victim with multiple persuasion techniques (Thompson, 2006) and the choice of approach 
will be tailored to the specific vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the targeted victim. The 
effect of using multiple persuasion techniques is to ‘put the victim in a kind of psychological 
haze that somehow changes what might otherwise be a normal ability to spot and resist 
persuasion’ (NASD, 2006, p.11). 
The final social engineering phase labelled utilisation of information (Bakhshi et al., 2009; 
Mitnick and Simon, 2002) typically involves offenders using personal information to gain 
unauthorised access to victim bank accounts, computer accounts or computer systems but it 
also has relevance to the exploitation phase as described here. Its application to boiler room 
fraud relates to a wider conceptualisation of social engineering tactics, in that the use of 
personal information facilitates a successful financial commitment from the victim to invest 
in a fraudulent opportunity. The information leads to a monetary output, rather than simply 
gaining access to an account or computer system. Therefore, the utilisation of information 
can be applied across several stages of boiler room fraud, including the initial follow up call, 
continued calls and the crisis point. 
It is proposed that a clear articulation and understanding of the role and operation of the 
exploitation phase is crucial in fraud prevention. Its application to the financial literacy 
curriculum would involve educating investors on the range of tactics and techniques used by 
offenders. Essentially, education would be clearly focused on expanding the approach of 
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investors beyond the application of their financial knowledge and skills in assessing 
investments. Investors who seek to proactively protect themselves from financial fraud 
victimisation also need to actively apply their knowledge of persuasion and social 
engineering tactics as part of their investment repertoire. It is argued that increasing 
‘traditional’ financial literacy knowledge, defined as knowledge of basic economic and 
investment principles, simple knowledge of risk and skills in management and accessing 
financial resources (Malone et al., 2010), is not sufficient to effectively protect against the 
approach of fraud offenders. 
Yielding 
The yielding stage of the PREY model correlates with the third identified stage of the social 
engineering framework, exploitation of trust (Bakhshi et al., 2009; Mitnick and Simon, 
2002), and while it applies to all stages of boiler room fraud, it is most notable at the final 
stage, the crisis point. At this stage, the offender will pressure the victim to continue to invest 
increasing amounts of money in the investment scheme and will refuse to accept any reasons 
provided by the victim to stop investing. Further, the offender will typically refuse to accept 
any request by the victim, for example the selling of shares, that would lead to the cessation 
of their involvement in the investment. 
This stage is usually initiated as a result of the victim wanting to terminate their involvement 
in the investment. Once the victim requests liquidation of their investment, whether that be 
because they simply want to realise their investment returns or because they suspect it is a 
fraud, the fraud begins to unravel. Offenders will use whatever persuasion techniques are 
necessary to convince the victim to reinvest their money (likely to be with an additional 
financial commitment) (ASIC, 2002b). Even if the victim has not yet recognised this as a 
fraudulent scheme, most victims will at this point become suspicious. However, given the 
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trust and effectiveness of persuasion techniques used by the offenders, some victims will be 
unable to resist further financial investment, despite their suspicions (ACC and AIC, 2012). 
The skill of the offender and the strength persuasion being used on the victim throughout the 
boiler room fraud process maximises the likelihood that many victims will continually yield 
to the demands and requests of the offender. The skills and targeted tactics used make it 
incredibly difficult for the victim to cease involvement in the fraud and acknowledge their 
financial losses (ACC and AIC, 2012). 
The relevance of this stage to making positive impacts on achieving better fraud prevention 
outcomes is difficult as this stage occurs following victimisation. However, what can be 
drawn from this stage is the importance of reporting financial fraud. Investors who do fall 
victim to financial fraud should be encouraged to report their experiences to the relevant 
regulatory bodies and police organisations. Not only does this provide the opportunity to 
pursue offenders and prosecute them, it is through a better understanding of how the financial 
fraud process is operationalised by offenders that better preventative mechanisms can be 
designed and implemented. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the PREY model presented in this paper was used to summarise the skills and 
techniques used by offenders in perpetrating investment (boiler room) fraud. Given research 
to suggest that financial literacy may not be as effective as previously thought in protecting 
against fraud victimisation (AARP, 2007, 2008; ACC and AIC, 2012; NASD, 2006), this 
model seeks to expand the financial literacy curriculum beyond attainment and application of 
financial knowledge and generic warnings about financial fraud. In order for better fraud 
prevention outcomes to be achieved, the curriculum needs to explicitly include education on 
social engineering and persuasion techniques. 
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The preceding discussion focused on examining the stages of the PREY model and derived 
specific proactive fraud prevention measures that could be integrated into the content of 
financial literacy curriculum. It was concluded that investors need to recognise, when they 
receive a cold call regarding an investment opportunity, that the caller (or offender) has 
typically already conducted research to determine the particular points of vulnerability for 
that victim (Profiled). Further, once the relationship between the potential victim and 
offender has been established it is more difficult for the potential victim to be objective about 
the interaction and offers being made (Relational and Exploitable). Continued interactions 
allow the offender to gather more information about the victim further reinforcing and 
extending the levers that can be used by them to engage the investor in the fraudulent scheme 
(Exploitable and Yielding). Investors who seek to protect themselves against financial fraud 
need to actively apply their knowledge of persuasion and social engineering tactics, beyond 
the application of their financial knowledge and skills. 
Extrapolating from these specific fraud prevention messages, it is also important to 
acknowledge two key general conclusions about fraud prevention in this context. First, many 
individuals do not realise the value of their personal information and how this can be used by 
offenders. An increased awareness of the worth of personal details may deter some 
individuals from providing this type of information without due consideration and assist in 
preventing them being as exposed to profiling and targeting by offenders. Second, greater 
awareness is needed in respect to the transfer to monies overseas, a tactic often used in 
financial fraud (ACC and AIC, 2012). Once money is sent offshore as part of an investment 
(or in this case boiler room fraud) the ability of financial institutions, police and/or regulators 
to recover such monies is extremely difficult, recovery of money is ‘not only difficult but 
unlikely’ (Button et al., 2009, p.31). These general conclusions clearly indicate and reinforce 
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that prevention is better than reaction, and that investors need to take steps to prevent or at 
least minimise the risk of being targeted and experiencing financial loss.  
It is important to consider how the proposed fraud prevention educational content proposed 
here, based on the PREY model, could be integrated into the financial literacy curriculum. 
Unfortunately, others have concluded that empirical validation of the effectiveness of 
programs designed to teach individuals to identify or resist persuasive, particularly deceptive 
or dishonest, techniques and tactics is limited (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice and Serna, 2002). 
However, despite this a number of general conclusions regarding how investors can be taught 
to identify and resist fraudulent, persuasive tactics can be proposed. Drawing on the empirical 
work of Sagarin et al. (2002), it is suggested that one effective strategy is heightening 
investors’ awareness of ‘undue manipulative intent’ (p. 528). In this case, investors are taught 
that fraud perpetrators use highly sophisticated persuasion tactics that are designed to exploit 
even those with high levels of financial knowledge and skill. This approach may be effective 
as it explicitly and directly challenges those who may be over-confident in their ability to 
accurately identify fraud due to their level of financial knowledge.  
Further, the above discussion which identified potential fraud prevention intervention points 
for each stage of the PREY model can be taught as decision-points for investors. This 
approach provides investors with general decision-points that allow them to have a base or 
starting point on which to evaluate whether the identified and known tactics of social 
persuasion and engineering are being used. It allows investors a general framework on which 
to discriminate between legitimate and fraudulent investment-related approaches (Sagarin et 
al., 2002). Application of rules should be taught experientially within the financial literacy 
curriculum to enhance the ability of investors to understand the evolving nature of identifying 
investment fraud, building up not a discrete set of rules but an adaptive approach that can be 
used dynamically across situations and contexts. 
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At a broad implementation level, it is suggested that the integration of education on social 
persuasion and social engineering tactics should, at least as a first step, be focused on specific 
target groups. As discussed earlier, existing research evidence finds that higher rates of 
financial literacy is generally correlated with age (ANZ, 2011) and in turn, age and financial 
literacy knowledge is often correlated with higher levels of financial fraud victimisation 
(AARP, 2011; NASD, 2006). It is proposed that the type of educational content proposed in 
this paper would be highly relevant to a target group with these characteristics and it is 
hypothesised would be positively related to better fraud prevention outcomes. It is likely that 
the target group described could be effectively engaged via a community education context or 
alternatively, through their financial advisor. This would require upskilling of community 
educators and financial advisors on the nature and scope of social persuasion and social 
engineering tactics in this context. 
The concept of PREY provides a framework that operationalises social engineering and 
persuasion tactics. The PREY model challenges investors to see themselves in the same way 
that offenders perceive them. Offenders perceive targets or prey as victims that can be 
profiled (Profiled), manipulated through the development of false trust and rapport 
(Relational), exploited (Exploitable) and pressured into yielding to offender demands 
(Yielding). In this paper it has been argued that individuals can be empowered to identify, 
resist and re-engineer the techniques of persuasion used against them by offenders. In this 
way the financial literacy curriculum can actively contribute to a proactive, fraud prevention 
framework and in turn, assist investors to protect their current and future financial well-being. 
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